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ADMIRALTY LAW
QUASI-CONTRACT RECOVERY PERMITTED FOR SERVICES RENDERED IN
NONSALVAGE EMERGENCY

Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc.
At common law, one who voluntarily confers a benefit upon
another is not entitled to restitution for the value of that benefit.'
As an exception to this well-established principle, recovery will be
permitted when a volunteer, qualified to do so by the nature of his
profession or otherwise, provides emergency services to a third person in performance of another's duty, with intent to charge therefor.2 In such a situation, the volunteer possesses a cause of action
in quasi-contract against the person in whose stead the duty has
been performed for the value of the services rendered.' Unrelated
ISee Hope, Officiousness (pts. 1 & 2), 15 CORNELL L.Q. 25, 205 (1929) [hereinafter cited
as Hope]; cf. Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The AltruisticIntermeddler, 74 HARV. L. REv. 817
(1961) (under the civil law, one who altruistically bestows a benefit on a friend may be
entitled to restitution); Lorenzen, The Negotiorum Gestio in Roman and Modern Civil Law,
13 CORNELL L.Q. 190 (1927) (restitution granted to altruistic volunteers in civil law countries).
Several exceptions to the volunteer rule have been recognized. Thus, restitution may be
obtained where the claimant acted through a reasonable mistake, see, e.g., Norfolk & Dedham Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 132 Vt. 341, 318 A.2d 659 (1974), or where the
conduct of the recipient was in some way blameworthy, cf. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United
States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (right of government to obtain restitution for removal from harbor
of shipowner's negligently sunk vessel). See generally RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 2, 3,
6, 70 (1937).
2 See, e.g., Robbins v. Town of Homer, 95 Minn. 201, 103 N.W. 1023 (1904); Gleason v.
Warner, 78 Minn. 405, 81 N.W. 206 (1899); Rundell v. Bentley, 53 Hun. 272, 6 N.Y.S. 609
(Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 3d Dep't 1889).
1 See Board of Comm'rs v. Greensburg Times, 215 Ind. 471, 20 N.E.2d 647 (1939). Quasicontract is a fiction whereby the law imposes an obligation upon an individual to pay for a
benefit he has received and for which he is not otherwise obligated to pay. See Thomas v.
Matthiessen, 232 U.S. 221, 225 (1913). A succinct explanation of this principle is contained
in Miller v. Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400, 113 N.E. 337 (1916):
A quasi or constructive contract rests upon the equitable principle that a person
shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. In truth
it is not a contract or promise at all. It is an obligation which the law creates, in
the absence of any agreement, when and because the acts of the parties or others
have placed in the possession of one person money, or its equivalent, under such
circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it, and
which ex aequo et bono belongs to another. Duty, and not a promise or agreement
or intention of the person sought to be charged, defines it. It is fictitiously deemed
contractual, in order to fit the cause of action to the contractual remedy.
Id. at 407, 113 N.E. at 339 (citations omitted). This principle found early application in
instances where the defendant had committed a tortious act; in such a case, the plaintiff was
permitted to waive the tort and sue in contract. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES § 4.2, at 238 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DOBBS] (citing Lamine v. Dorrell, 92 Eng.
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to the law of restitution, the traditional rules of maritime salvage
allow volunteers who preserve property from maritime peril to recover for their services, 4 while denying rescuers of human life a
similar award.5 Against this background, the Second Circuit, in
Rep. 303 (K.B. 1706)). See generally W. KEENER, THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS 15 (1893).
Gradually, the scope of the action was broadened to encompass other, nontortious situations.
See, e.g., Bradkin v. Leverton, 26 N.Y.2d 192, 257 N.E.2d 643, 309 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1970).
It is widely accepted that unjust enrichment does not necessarily imply that the defendant has obtained an advantage through wrongful or unlawful conduct, Lengel v. Lengel, 86
Misc. 2d 460, 465, 382 N.Y.S.2d 678, 681 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1976), but merely that he
has received a benefit which in good conscience he should return, Champaign County v.
Hanks, 41 Ill. App. 3d 679, 353 N.E. 2d 405 (1976). The plaintiff must demonstrate that there
has been an enrichment and that injustice would result if recovery were denied. See Belmont
Indus., Inc. v. Bechtel Corp., 425 F. Supp. 524, 526 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1976); RESTATEMENT OF
RESTrrUTION § 1, Comment a (1937). It has been held that the plaintiff's loss need not
correspond to the gain received by the defendant. See Saunders v. Kline, 55 App. Div. 887,
888, 391 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1st Dep't 1977).
1 See Legnos v. MV Olga Jacob, 498 F.2d 666, 669 (5th Cir. 1974); In re Sun Oil Co.,
342 F. Supp. 976, 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 474 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1973). Salvage
has been defined as a legal liability created by the rescue of property from perils of the sea.
G. CANFIELD & G. DALZEL, THE LAW OF THE SEA 180 (1937). A salvor is one who "without any
particular relation to a ship or property in distress, performs useful service, and gives it as a
volunteer without any pre-existing contract that connected him with the duty of employing
himself for the preservation of the ship or property." M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SALVAGE § 4
(1958). See, e.g., Shorts v. Dravo Constr. Co., 1938 A.M.C. 57 (E.D. Pa. 1937). The judgment
awarding salvage, which runs in rem against the property involved, is computed with reference to the value of the rescued property and the salving vessel, the dangers involved, as well
as the skill and success of the salvor and his losses, and may include a bonus. See Nicastro
v. The Gas Screw Peggy B., 173 F. Supp. 61, 63 (D. Mass. 1959). The notion that salvage is
premised on an implied contract between the parties has been rejected. In The Cargo ex Port
Victor, [1901] P. 243 (C.A.), the court stated that "[t]o rest the jurisdiction of the admiralty
court upon. . . an implied contract between the salvors and owner with the relinquishment
of the res for consideration is . . . to confuse two different systems of law and to resort to a
misleading analogy." Id. at 249. Additionally, the court noted that admiralty law imposes a
duty upon the owner to pay the salvor, "simply because in the view of that system of law it
is just as he should." Id.
Contract salvage, on the other hand, is a service rendered a ship owner by a salvor
pursuant to an agreement fixing the amount of compensation. The distinction between salvage and contract salvage is crucial, since a salvor's lien is superior to and of a higher priority
than that of a contractor or materialman. See, e.g., Hempstead v. The Escapade, 173 F.
Supp. 833 (S.D. Fla. 1959), aff'd sub nom. Reliance Ins. Co. v. The Escapade, 280 F.2d 482
(5th Cir. 1960).
1 A salvor historically could obtain an award for saving human life only when he also
saved property in conjunction therewith. G. ROBINSON, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW 709
(1939). An individual was deemed under a moral obligation to save human life; hence, "pure"
life salvage did not entitle the salvor to an award. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF
ADMImALTY § 8-1, at 532 (2d ed. 1975). A more practically sound explanation for the traditional
disallowance of "pure" life salvage recovery is the lack of a res against which an in rem
judgment might be granted. The Renpor, 8 P.D. 115, 117 (C.A. 1883). See generallyBockrath,
The American Law of Life Salvage, 7 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 207, 210 n.3 (1975); Jarrett, The
Life Salvor Problem in Admiralty, 63 YALE L.J. 779, 781 (1954).
The United States and Great Britain have enacted legislation mitigating the effects of
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Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc., I addressed the question whether a shipowner may recover
for fuel costs caused by the diversion of its vessel to aid a stricken
seaman aboard the defendant's seaworthy vessel in the midAtlantic.7 Finding the traditional "life-salvage" rule inapplicable,
8
the court granted recovery based upon quasi-contract principles.
The Canberra, a vessel owned by the plaintiff, Peninsular &
Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O), received a radio message hailing all ships with doctors aboard.9 A swift passenger liner
that carried a trained medical staff with complete operating facilities, the Canberra, was the nearest vessel to respond to the distress
signal.' 0 The ship was requested to rendezvous with the Overseas
Progress, a vessel owned by the defendant, in order to provide emergency medical treatment for an ailing seaman," Fireman William
Turpin." The captain of the Canberra, having notified the Overseas
Progress that reimbursement for expenses might be sought, altered
the ship's course and increased her speed to intercept the Overseas
3
Progress, a slow tanker already traveling at her maximum speed.'
the life salvage rule. Under the British Merchant Marine Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 60 §§
544-546, life salvors are entitled to a fair share of the award granted to property salvors. In
addition, under the Mercantile Marine Fund Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 60 § 677(e), salvors
who rescue human life in British waters may be awarded a sum in satisfaction of their claim
by the Board of Trade in situations where the vessel or cargo involved has been destroyed or
where the value thereof is insufficient to cover salvage claims. In contrast, legislation in the
United States, § 3 of the Salvage Act of 1912, 46 U.S.C. § 729 (1970), provides that "[slalvors
of human life, who have taken part in the services rendered on the occasion of the accident
giving rise to salvage, are entitled to a fair share of the remuneration awarded to the salvors
of the vessel, her cargo, and accessories." Courts have tended to construe the Salvage Act
narrowly. See, e.g., St. Paul Marine Transp. Corp. v. Cerro Sales Corp., 313 F. Supp. 377
(D. Hawaii 1970); In re Yamashita-Shinnihon Kisen, 305 F. Supp. 796 (D. Ore. 1969)
(mem.). But see The Shreveport, 42 F.2d 524 (E.D.S.C. 1930).
' 553 F.2d 830 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 183 (1977), rev'g 418 F. Supp. 656
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
553 F.2d at 832.
Id. at 835.
Id. at 832.
10Id. Vessels carrying in excess of 50 passengers are required to carry on board a qualified
surgeon and a full complement of surgical instruments, medicines and other medical supplies.
See 46 U.S.C. § 155 (1970).
" Ships that carry no more than 50 passengers, such as the Overseas Progress, are not
required to have a physician or medical staff on board. See 46 U.S.C. § 155 (1970).
2 553 F.2d at 832. Fireman Turpin was stricken with severe chest pains on the day prior
to the occurrence of the events at issue. Believing that Turpin had suffered a heart attack,
the ship's officers, aided by medical books and advice received by radio from the Public
Health Service, administered morphine and glycerine nitrate to the victim. Without a doctor
on board to treat him, however, Turpin deteriorated to the extent that he suffered another
heart attack on the following day. Id.
,1 Id. The Canberra was capable of traveling at almost 29 knots, while the maximum
speed of the Overseas Progress was less than 14 knots. Id. At the latter rate of speed, it would
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Upon effecting the rendezvous, the Canberra's captain presented a
letter reiterating that reimbursement for expenses might be sought
from the owner of the Overseas Progress. 4 After the letter was
countersigned by the captain of the Overseas Progress, Turpin was
transferred to the Canberra where he received emergency medical
treatment. By maintaining an increased rate of speed, the Canberra
arrived in New York only shortly behind schedule. Upon disembarkation, Turpin was rushed by ambulance to a shore hospital where
he eventually recovered.'"
P&O requested reimbursement from the owners of the Overseas
Progress for the extra fuel consumed by the Canberra as a result of
the diversion and the increased speed, as well as for nursing services
rendered and accommodations furnished Turpin."1 When this request was refused, P&O commenced an action in the District Court
for the Southern District of New York. The court denied the plaintiff recovery in quasi-contract for fuel expended in the rescue effort
but awarded $500 for Turpin's nursing and accommodation expen7
ses.
have taken the Overseas Progress 57 hours to reach the nearest shore hospital. Id. at 833. The
rendezvous with the Canberra, in contrast, was effected within 7 hours. Id.
11Id. The parties stipulated that the letter served neither as a demand for reimbursement nor as a promise to pay. Rather, the ships' captains intended to leave the question of
reimbursement to their superiors. Id.
11Id. American seamen are entitled to receive medical care and to be hospitalized at
United States Public Health Service Hospitals. See 42 U.S.C. § 249 (1970); 42 C.F.R. §
32.6(a)(1) (1976). If such facilities are not available, treatment may be obtained at another
hospital at the expense of the Service. Id. § 32.11-.12. Seamen who elect to receive treatment
from private physicians or who otherwise refuse treatment at the marine hospital are not
reimbursed for medical expenses. See Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938).
Exceptions are made for seamen who require emergency treatment at private facilities or who
cannot be properly treated at the marine facility. See Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F.2d
1048 (1st Cir. 1973); Kaiser v. American Pres. Lines, Ltd., 385 F. Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
George v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 348 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Va. 1972).
"1 553 F.2d at 833. The defendant, Overseas Oil Carriers, had paid to the Canberra's
surgeon a sum of money in satisfaction of medical expenses. Id.
7 418 F. Supp. at 659. In rejecting plaintiff's claim for diversion expenses, the district
court stated that since no misconduct or fault on the part of the defendant was shown,
recovery would not be awarded. Id.; accord, F.E. Grauwiller Transp. Co. v. King, 131 F. Supp.
630, 634 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd sub nom. F.E. Grauwiller Transp. Co. v. The Jeanne, 229 F.2d
153 (2d Cir. 1956) (per curiam); New York Tel. Co. v. Teichner, 69 Misc. 2d 135, 329 N.Y.S.2d
689 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1972). But see Kane v. MN Leda, 355 F. Supp. 796, 801 (E.D.
La. 1972), affl'd, 491 F.2d 899 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 865 (1974). In
disposing of plaintiff's claim for expenses incurred in furnishing nursing and accommodations, however, the Peninsulardistrict court did not find the absence of fault on the part of
the defendant to be controlling. The court noted that "[h]ad the defendant's ship been in
port it would have been required to pay such expenses for its crew member. . . . Moreover,
these costs accrued after the transfer ('rescue') was effected and were part of custodial treatment and care." 418 F. Supp. at 659-60. Therefore, it was concluded that there was "one
aspect of unjust enrichment present here." Id. at 659.
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On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court's denial
of fuel expenses.' 8 As a threshold question, Chief Judge Kaufman,
writing for a unanimous panel,'9 considered whether the federal
courts may properly exercise jurisdiction over quasi-contractual
claims in admiralty. Citing Archawski v. Haniotill as controlling,
the Peninsular court ruled that P&O's claim for restitution was
cognizable in admiralty, since it arose from an "inherently maritime
transaction."2 Turning to the merits, the Second Circuit found that
the Canberra, in acceding to the request for aid by the Overseas
Progress, had earned the right to recover the fair value of the costs
incurred. 22 When Turpin fell ill, Judge Kaufman observed, his captain became obligated, pursuant to the traditional maritime princi24
ple of "maintenance and cure, '23 to provide medical care swiftly.
, 553 F.2d at 833.
The panel consisted of Chief Judge Kaufman and Circuit Judges Lumbard and Van
Graafeiland.
350 U.S. 532 (1956).
ZI 553 F.2d at 835. The court stated that "[iut is difficult to imagine a transaction more
maritime in nature than the one presented here.
...
Id. In earlier decisions, quasicontractual claims were not considered cognizable in admiralty. See notes 35-44 and accompanying text infra. A thesis expounded in support of this view held that since a quasi-contract
is an implied agreement collateral to any contract, claims based upon such a theory are not
inherently maritime in nature. See, e.g., Israel v. Moore & McCormack, Inc., 295 F. 919 (2d
Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 668 (1922). See generally Chandler, Quasi ContractualRelief
in Admiralty, 27 MICH. L. REV. 23 (1928).
553 F.2d at 832.
Under the doctrine of "maintenance and cure," a seaman who suffers illness or injury
during his employment is entitled to a living allowance and medical treatment at the expense
of the owner of the vessel on which the seaman served. Additionally, the disabled seaman is
entitled to the recovery of the salary he would have earned had he the opportunity to complete
the contractual term of his employment or the particular voyage on which he became disabled. See H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT 1 (2d ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited
as BAER]. See generally I. HALL, H. SANN & S. BELLMAN, 1B BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 41 (7th
ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as BENEDICT]. The seaman is entitled to these benefits until he
has reached the point of his "maximum cure." See Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370
U.S. 31 (1962); Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949). He is not, however, entitled to
maintenance and cure if his condition is not subject to improvement. See Fitzgerald v. United
States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963); cf. Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1 (1975) (obligation
to furnish maintenance and cure continues until permanent injury is diagnosed).
Maintenance and cure is recoverable without regard to the negligence of the seaman or
the owner; the gross misconduct of the seaman, however, may preclude recovery. See, e.g.,
Ressler v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 517 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 894 (1975);
Matthews v. Gulf & S. Am. S.S. Co., 339 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1964) (per curiam).
Failure to disclose an existing condition does not result in the denial of maintenance and
cure where such failure was in good faith. See, e.g., Sammon v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 442
F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 881 (1971); Burkert v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 350
F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1965). Compare McCorpen v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 396 F.2d 547 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 894 (1968) (any concealment of existing condition precludes
award) with Evans v. Blidberg Rothchild Co., 382 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1967) (fraudulent misrepresentation bars recovery) and Bluin v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 319 F.
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Since the vessel did not carry a medical staff, the captain's obligation included having Fireman Turpin transported to the nearest
medical facility.2 According to the Second Circuit, this duty was
undertaken and performed by the Canberra at the request of the
Overseas Progress .21 In so doing, the Canberra had incurred considerable costs which otherwise would have been borne by the Overseas
Progress. 27 In support of its position, the Peninsularcourt pointed
to a line of decisions in which a good samaritan, acting in an emergency, had voluntarily intervened to perform a duty owed by a third
party and had been permitted to recover the reasonable value of his
services.Y Noting that the actors in those cases had intended to
charge for their services, 91 Judge Kaufman found such intent evidenced in the instant case by the countersigned letter from the
Supp. 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (meri.) (only fraudulent concealment bars recovery).
Traditionally available only to seamen in a ship's company, maintenance and cure is
currently available to anyone who is a seaman within the meaning of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 688 (1970). See, e.g., Mahramas v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 165
(2d Cir. 1973) (hairdresser); Vincent v. Harvey Well Serv., 441 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1971) (employees on offshore oil drilling platforms); George v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 348 F. Supp. 283
(E.D. Va. 1972) (tug pilot living ashore); Richardson v. St. Charles-St. John the Baptist
Bridge & Ferry Auth., 284 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. La. 1968) (commuting deckhand on ferry);
Hudspeth v. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. La. 1967) (commuting
deckhand on tug); M. NoRms, THE LAw OF SEAMEN § 553 (3d ed. 1970).
2 553 F.2d at 834.
13Id.; accord, The Iroquois, 194 U.S. 240 (1904) (captain bound to put into port when
sailor stricken, unless cargo would be seriously injured by delay); Media v. Erickson, 226 F.2d
475 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 912 (1956) (duty to return to port depends upon
seriousness of illness); cf. Pappas v. The Eurymond, 1964 A.M.C. 1860 (E.D. Va. 1963), aff'd,
339 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (dangerous climate conditions may justify captain's
refusal to change itinerary).
21 553 F.2d at 834.
n Id. at 834-35 & 835 n.4. P&O had originally requested a sum totaling $12,108.95 for
accommodation and nursing, diversion expenses and additional fuel consumed by virtue of
the increased speed of the vessel. Id. at 833. Overseas refused to concede that the rendezvous
proximately caused the fuel expenses claimed, however, and the Second Circuit requested
both parties to attempt to reach an agreement concerning the actual expenses involved in
seaman Turpin's rescue. Id. at 837 n.7. Accordingly, the parties stipulated that $6,294.30 of
the additional fuel expenses were attributable to the "rescue" and $2,205.70 attributable to
the Canberra's diversion. Id.
3 Id. at 834 (citing Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N.J. 426, 97 A.2d 390 (1953)). While the
Peninsular district court had found that the Canberra was not a mere volunteer, it noted that
the liner, a foreign flag vessel operating in international waters, was under no statutory duty
to aid Turpin. 418 F. Supp. at 660. Section 2 of the Salvage Act of 1912, 46 U.S.C. § 728
(1970), which applies only to vessels of United States registry, provides:
The master or person in charge of a vessel shall, so far as he can do so without
serious danger to his own vessel, crew, or passengers, render assistance to every
person who is found at sea in danger of being lost; and if he fails to do so, he shall,
upon conviction, be liable to a penalty of not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment for
a term not exceeding two years, or both.
553 F.2d at 834 (citing Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N.J. 426, 443, 97 A.2d 390, 399 (1953)).
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captain of the Canberra indicating that reimbursement for expenses
3
might be sought. 1
Dismissing the traditional life salvage rule as irrelevant, since
the case did not involve a "daring rescue at sea, 31 the Second
Circuit was of the opinion that the case merely involved the transfer
of an ailing seaman from one seaworthy vessel to another.32 On a
policy level, Judge Kaufman rejected the contention that permitting recovery would render small ship captains reluctant to request
assistance, pointing out that ships' masters are legally bound "to
make reasonable efforts to secure medical care for their stricken
crewmen. ' 3 3 The court noted, moreover, that its decision should
allay any fear on the part of larger craft that unreasonable expenses
will be incurred in the performance of emergency services for
smaller vessels and thereby encourage the rendering of such assis34
tance.
Modern admiralty courts have been reluctant to entertain
quasi-contract claims.35 Indeed, according to one noted authority,
the scope of quasi-contractual relief available in admiralty was uncertain as late as 1975.36 Although in Archawski v. Hanioti,37 an
action for the recovery of money paid for a voyage subsequently
cancelled, the Supreme Court permitted recovery based upon quasicontract theory, it limited such recovery to claims arising out of
underlying maritime agreements.3 8 The Second Circuit, however, in
Sword Line, Inc. v. United States,39 apparently expanding admiralty jurisdiction beyond the parameters established by the Supreme Court, stated that claims in quasi-contract are cognizable in
admiralty if such claims arise from maritime transactions, even
" 553 F.2d at 835. The court stated that the letter handed to the captain of the Overseas
Progress "was sufficient to put Overseas on notice that the services were not intended as a
gratuity." Id. at 835 n.4.
11Id. at 836.
2Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
"Id.
See BAER, supra note 23, at 365-67; 1 BENEDICT, supra note 23, at § 191.
G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 27 (2d ed. 1975). See 7A MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE .27511], at 3175 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].

"

350 U.S. 532 (1956).

In permitting recovery in quasi-contract, the Archawski Court stated:
How far the concept of quasi-contracts may be applied in admiralty it is unnecessary to decide. It is sufficient this day to hold that admiralty has jurisdiction,
even where the libel reads like indebitatusassumpsit at common law, provided that
the unjust enrichment arose as a result of the breach of a maritime agreement.
Id. at 536.
39 230 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), affl'd, 351 U.S. 976 (1956) (per curiam).
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though there exists no contract at the core of the controversy. 0
Affirming the decision of the Second Circuit in an opinion limited
to the jurisdictional issue, the Supreme Court concluded that "the
libel alleg[ed] unjust enrichment from a maritime contract."4'
It would thus appear that the Second Circuit has indicated its
willingness to deviate from the Supreme Court's requirement that
quasi-contractual claims -in admiralty be premised upon an underlying maritime contract. In so doing, it is submitted, the Second
Circuit has opted for a desirable and rational approach.4 2 Since
1 Judge Clark, writing for the Sword Line majority, examined prior decisions holding
quasi-contractual claims cognizable in admiralty and rejected the notion that a maritime
contract must serve as the underpinning of a quasi-contractual claim:
In all these cases it may be broadly true that the original admiralty charter
was at the base of the case. But from the standpoint of recovery, the action is not
for its breach, but for a debt, i.e., the refund due in good conscience... . . We think
it sounder, and more in accordance with the nature of admiralty, to rest upon the
inherent maritime character of the underlying transaction, rather than upon an
attempt to force this claim into the mold of breach of contract.
230 F.2d at 77.
' 351 U.S. at 969 (emphasis added).
42 One noted commentator has stated that the recognition of a distinction between quasicontracts arising from an underlying agreement and claims in quasi-contract having no agreement at the core "would unduly and unnecessarily complicate an area which the Supreme
Court seems to have clarified in Archawski v. Hanioti." MOORE, supra note 36, at 3175. That
author went on to note that "l[all that is necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of the admiralty
is that the action quasi ex contractu appertain to navigation or commerce upon navigable
waters. No further requirements or refinements need, nor should, be sought." Id. at 3176;
accord, Banta v. McNeil, 2 F. Cas. 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1871).
That which constitutes a maritime transaction is not always easily determined. In Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961), for example, the plaintiff became ill while in
the service of his vessel. The defendant, United Fruit, insisted that he accept treatment at a
Public Health Service Hospital, promising to assume responsibility for any inadequate or
improper treatment the hospital might render. Pursuant to this oral agreement, Kossick
entered the public hospital and allegedly received injuries as a result of the hospital's negligence. The plaintiff brought an action against United Fruit on the oral contract. A unanimous
Second Circuit panel dismissed the suit, explaining that "[tihe contract sued on is not a
maritime contract, since it was merely a promise to pay money, on land. . . ." 275 F.2d 500,
502 (2d Cir. 1960). The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority,
stated that the boundaries of contract jurisdiction in admiralty were "conceptual rather than
spatial." 365 U.S. at 735. The oral agreement, according to the Court, "related to and stood
in place of a duty [of maintenance and cure] created by and known only in admiralty as a
kind of fringe benefit to the maritime contract of hire." Id. at 736. By focusing on the
inherently maritime flavor of the agreement, the Kossick Court opted for an approach that
diverges from the traditional English rule. See generally MOORE, supra note 36, at 2701-02
(only contracts "made and done" on the sea were considered maritime in nature).
Application of the Supreme Court's flexible approach, however, has proven problematic.
As Professor Moore has stated:
[C]ontracts to build vessels are today universally deemed non-maritime, while
contracts to repair vessels are maritime. Contracts to procure a policy of marine
insurance are outside the jurisdiction of admiralty, even though the policies of
insurance themselves are within the maritime jurisdiction. Contracts to purchase
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admiralty courts are empowered to entertain claims sounding in
unjust enrichment, as the Supreme Court has ruled, it would seem
unsound to limit this power to situations involving a maritime contract;43 in fact, the availability of quasi-contractual relief would
appear equally, if not more, necessary in instances where a contract
was not entered into by the parties."
The Peninsularcourt's application of quasi-contract principles
to the instant situation, however, appears somewhat questionable.
For policy reasons, restititution usually has been awarded to a qualified intervenor who performs the duty of another in an emergency
situation and intends to charge for his services. 5 This rule mitigates
the harshness of the traditional common law reluctance to remunerate volunteers for services rendered to nonacquiescent recipients.
Recovery generally has been permitted, however, only in situations
where emergency services are performed either by a professional
without the request or knowledge of the obligor,"6 or by a parent for
his child in satisfaction of a statutory duty neglected by a governmental unit.47 In the often-cited case of Greenspan v. Slate,4" for
vessels are generally deemed non-maritime, notwithstanding that contracts to
charter vessels are universally recognized as being within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the district courts. And it is doubtful whether actions taken
against sureties of maritime ventures can be brought within the maritime jurisdiction, notwithstanding that actions against guarantors and indemnitors of such ventures have been permitted in admiralty.
Id. at 2712.
" See Sword Lines, Inc. v. United States, 230 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 351 U.S. 976
(1956) (per curiam); note 42 supra.
" One commentator, describing the evolution of quasi-contractual relief at common law,
called it a "detached system of awarding restitution in cases where neither tort nor contract
necessarily existed." DOBBS, supra note 3, § 4.2, at 235.
1 See, e.g., Robbins v. Town of Homer, 95 Minn. 201, 103 N.W. 1023 (1905); Gleason v.
Warner, 78 Minn. 405, 81 N.W. 206 (1889); Rundell v. Bentley, 53 Hun. 272, 6 N.Y.S. 609
(Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 3d Dep't 1889). RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 114 (1937). The Restatement
provides:
A person who has performed the duty of another by supplying a third person
with necessaries, although acting without the other's knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution therefor if
(a) he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor, and
(b) the things or services were immediately necessary to prevent serious
bodily harm to or suffering by such third person.
Id.
46 See notes 48-52 and accompanying text infra.
4 See, e.g., Sommers v. Putnam County Bd. of Educ., 113 Ohio St. 177, 148 N.E. 682
(1925) (quasi-contractual recovery allowed for transportation costs incurred by parents);
Rysdam v. School Dist. No. 67, 154 Or. 347, 58 P.2d 614 (1936) (failure of school district to
provide transportation to school children permits recovery by parents). Compare Watkins v.
Medical & Dental Fin. Bureau, 101 Ariz. 580, 422 P.2d 696 (1967) (en banc) (only in the face
of manifest dereliction of duty by parent will volunteer be entitled to remuneration) with
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instance, a physician was awarded quasi-contractual recovery for
treating a minor's fractured foot. Finding the requisite elements of
duty, jusitification, intent to charge, and exigency satisfied,4 9 the
Greenspan court allowed the physician to recover the fair market
value of his services." While it may be presumed that physicians
intend to charge for their professional services," it does not appear
that any such presumption operates in favor of ships at sea performing emergency lifesaving acts.12 Indeed, in such a situation it would
seem that the emergency transportation service provided by the
vessel should be presumed gratuitous.5 3 In the absence of evidence
to rebut this presumption, therefore, the owners of the Canberra
would not be entitled to restitution. Unfortunately, neither the Second Circuit nor the district court in Peninsulardiscussed the presumption of gratuity. 4 Thus, neither tribunal reached the question
whether the presumption was overcome in this instance. Without
such a finding, it is difficult to reconcile the Peninsularresult with
State Div. of Family Serv. v. Clark, 554 P.2d 1310 (Utah 1976) (parent liable to third party
for necessaries furnished a child).
*' 12 N.J. 426, 97 A.2d 390 (1953).
' Id. at 443, 97 A.2d at 399. The Greenspan court purportedly applied the rule enunciated in the RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 114 (1937), quoted in note 45 supra.
" 12 N.J. at 443, 97 A.2d at 399.
"

Id.; RESTATEMENT

OF RESTITUTION

§ 114, Comment c (1937). The presumption of gratu-

ity normally appertaining to life salving services of non-professionals is not applicable to
physicians. It has been said that "[s]ince it is their business to save life, health, and limb,
the presumption is that they intend to charge, and that those treated by them expect to pay."
Hope, supra note 1, at 235-36, wherein the question whether a physician acting in an emergency can ever be officious is discussed at length and answered in the negative. Id. at 23638. See also Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907) (physician allowed recovery
for treating an unconscious patient).
5 Professor Hope distinguished between a volunteer and an officious intermeddler. A
volunteer, he explained, "would properly be one who acts for another without being requested
and without being induced to do so by mistake or compulsion of any sort." Hope, supra note
1, at 28. Officiousness, on the other hand, implies that the benefit conferred was
"unrequested, forced, unbeneficial, [and] unnecessary." Id. at 27 (emphasis in original). In
the latter case, Professor Hope noted, an award is never granted. Id. Contrasting the treatment of a volunteer by common law and admiralty courts, Professor Hope noted that no
presumption of gratuity is attached to the maritime volunteer who renders emergency aid
to save the property of another. "In principle and logic," opined Professor Hope, "it is
impossible to make the common law distinction between property in danger of destruction
on the sea and property so threatened on land." Id. at 36. Professor Hope advocated that
"reasonable action by A in saving B's property [on land or on the sea] should be encouraged
and suitably rewarded." Id.
5 One who acts to preserve another's life in an emergency is not adjudicated officious.
Hope, supra note 1, at 38. Such situations, however, present courts with the greatest opportunity to indulge in the presumption that the service was intended as a "gift." Id. Thus, in
those situations where the endangered individual most requires aid, the rescuer "must expect
to give it for nothing." Id. at 39.
m See 553 F.2d at 834-35; 418 F. Supp. at 659.
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general quasi-contract principles.
In addition to its problematic application of the law of restitution, the Peninsularcourt apparently overlooked a line of admiralty
decisions denying a plaintiff compensation for performance of the
maintenance and cure duty owned by the defendant. 5 For example,
in Rey v. Penn Shipping Co.,5" the plaintiff furnished lodging and
nursing, on a deferred payment basis, to a disabled seaman. After
the seaman failed to make payment, Rey commenced an action
against the employer. The district court ruled that the plaintiff was
not entitled to compensation from the owner of the vessel.5 Finding
that no theory, including quasi-contract, provided a basis for the
plaintiff's action against the owners of the vessel, the Second Circuit
affirmed. 8 The court explained that quasi-contractual relief was not
available, as the owner of the vessel had not been unjustly enriched;
the latter would be liable to the seaman, the Second Circuit stated,
if the seaman were held liable to the plaintiff.-9 Although it did not
expressly so state, perhaps the Rey court was indicating that maintenance and cure is not the type of duty which, when performed by
a third party, gives rise to an action in quasi-contract against the
original obligor." In any event, the Rey line of decisions, it is submitted, points to a result contrary to that reached by the Second
Circuit in Peninsular.' Under Rey, the plaintiff should have been
m' See text accompanying notes 56 & 60 infra.
1960 A.M.C. 2330 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), affl'd, 277 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
829 (1960).
1960 A.M.C. at 2330.
277 F.2d at 906.
" Id. Judge Friendly stated that "a purveyor of goods or services to a seaman entitled
Id. Judge Friendly
to maintenance and cure may not himself sue the ship or her owner ....
added that he saw "no basis for permitting [maintenance and cure] to be enforced by a
person who has supplied the seaman with services or supplies on credit that might properly
figure in the seaman's own recovery." Id.
" See cases cited in note 47 supra.
" See The Federal No. 2, 21 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1927) (maintenance and cure paid to
injured seaman may not be recovered by owner in suit against tortfeasor); Hegstead v.
Standard Transp. Co., 1934 A.M.C. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (parent-landlord of seaman not
entitled to subrogation of maintenance and cure claim); Cheng v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 1926
A.M.C. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1926) (treating physician may not be subrogated to rights of seaman
to maintenance and cure); cf. Jones v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 155 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1946)
(release of third party tortfeasor by seaman does not preclude seaman's receipt of maintenance and cure). But see Methodist Episcopal Hosp. v. Pacific Transp. Co., 3 F.2d 508 (N.D.
Cal. 1920) (hospital subrogated to seaman's rights).
Furthermore, the Restatement of Restitution, relied upon by the Peninsularcourt,
provides in § 114 for recovery where the duty performed by the intervenor is imposed
on the obligor by law, as in the parent-child relationship, or by contract. RESTATEMENT OF
REsTrrurioN § 114, Comment c (1937). The obligation to pay maintenance and cure, however,
has been labeled as quasi-contractual in nature. See Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S.
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denied direct relief against the employer and relegated to its remedy
against the seaman who received the services. 2
Commenting upon the injustice which stems from application
of the life-salvage rule, the Peninsularcourt characterized that mar6 3
itime doctrine as "hoary, and almost universally condemned. 1
Thus, dissatisfaction with the salvage principle apparently was a
factor contributing to the Peninsularresult. Considerations of fairness may well militate in favor of its holding, but the Peninsular
court's analysis nonetheless seems to depart from prior decisional
law. It is suggested, therefore, that a final resolution of the dilemna
which confronted the Second Circuit may only be effected by legislative action.
Ralph J. Libsohn
724, 730 (1943); Crooks v. United States, 459 F.2d 631, 632 (9th Cir. 1972). The section,
therefore, appears inapplicable to the Peninsularsituation.
11227 F.2d at 907. The Rey court stated that there is no legal theory to support a right
of direct action by a third party against a shipowner for maintenance and cure. Id. It is
submitted that the Peninsularcourt, by permitting P&O to base its claim in quasi-contract
on the underlying maintenance and cure obligation, has permitted such a direct action.
11553 F.2d at 836.

